Overall this chapter was very hard to make sense of. It made me question again the usefulness of such rigorous philosophical exercises. Even Naess himself says in parts of the book that those of us who are engaged with our personal ‘place’ have no time for metaphysical thought, in favour of concrete action; “People who are completely absorbed in the land have no need for high levels of abstraction and articulation”. Although a digression from the intended reflection of this blog post, it is important to know that this quote is preceded by the sentence, “Most supporters of the deep ecology movement are intimately acquainted with urbanisation” which in turn gives them better training to make their implicit global attitudes a basis for action (Naess, 2016, p.45). From this, some light might be gleamed on the advantages of both concrete action and abstract thought.
The beginning of this chapter recognises the persistent criticism that environmental activists face when trying to save a natural entity – such as a river, forest, animal or some other form of living/ non-living thing – due to the subjectivity of their personal experience with said entity. Their critics argue that this is not “reality as in fact”, but “reality as they feel it.”
According to Galileo, the motion of water molecules are an intrinsic property of water and so part of reality itself. Felt warmth however takes on a subjective existence. Naess argues, however, that the primary properties of a thing are conceptual or ens rationis, in that they only exist within the mind and so inherently are not parts of reality for the observer. Galileo’s thing-in-itself conception of water is challenged again by Naess’ idea that “no quality of a thing is such that it is separable from others.” Naess sees sensing and comprehension as the ‘primary qualities’ of a thing; Concrete contents have a “one to one correlation with constellations,” defined here as a group of associated things. As a result our experience of water is in relation to an irreducible and complex constellation of relata, that eliminates both objectivism and subjectivism. Such is “the colours of the sea as a part of innumerable gestalts” (Naess, 2016, p.73).
Problematically, Galileo’s worldview that secondary contents are a result of our own projections removes the need for altruistic intentions altogether. If we were to reduce our conception of things to their supposed primary qualities, and pay no attention to our spontaneous experience of them using our senses, then everything is suddenly reduced to a resource. Naess rejects the notion that sense qualities are projected and that things in themselves exist separately from their myriad of secondary and tertiary qualities. Instead he proposes an ontology whereby all qualities are on par with one another, as a traditional take on primary properties presupposes them as merely characteristics of abstract structure, not contents of reality.
Using Naess’ ideas we can formulate a more sustainable method of creating environmental motivation. For the conservationist, concrete contents are most likely understood as a constellation of gestalt relations, whether they are conscious of it or not. For the developer, however, ethics surrounding environmental concerns are informed by feelings based on their objective view of reality. As a result, any attempt to appeal to their morality will fall on deaf ears. It seems it is more a matter of personal ontology. Therefore changing conception should be our primary concern as opposed to brute force. “There is no way of making the developer eager to save a forest as long as he or she retains the conception of it as a set of trees” (Naess, 2016, p.77).
“Ecology changes our values by changing our concepts of the world of ourselves in relation to the world.”
(Callicot, 1982)
Despite the reduction of primary properties to abstract structures, being those that exist within the mind, Naess reminds us it would be unwise to underestimate their importance. Such structures are applied throughout the world by humans to help gain a deeper understanding of it. They are paramount to science and that of deep ecology too. Nevertheless, these structures should not be over-identified as contents of the world we experience. As Naess puts it, “Abstract structures are structures of the world, not in the world” and “The world of concrete contents has gestalt character, not atomic character”(2016, pp.79-80). Thoughts on perspectivism, too, can help us reduce a subject-object division by using the term ‘experience’ without giving it ownership. After all, according to his holistic world view, our mere existence is only another piece of relata in the constellation of the world.
Bibliography
J. Baird Callicot, “Hume’s Is/Ought Dichotomy and the Relation of Ecology to Leopold’s Land Ethic.” Environmental ethics 4, 1982, pp.163-174
Naess’, Arne. “An Example of a Place: Tvargastein.” Ecology of Wisdom, edited by Alan Drengson and Bill Devall, Penguin Classics, 2016, p.45
Naess’, Arne. “The World of Concrete Contents.” Ecology of Wisdom, edited by Alan Drengson and Bill Devall, Penguin Classics, 2016, pp.71-80