Author: Daniel Pakdel

Naess believes that the process of self-realisation is conducive to creating an extended ecological self. He claims that “Increased self-realisation implies a broadening and deepening of the self” (Naess, 2016, p…). He uses Eric Fromm’s writings on the self to clarify this further. Fromm offers an alternative perspective to Freud’s theory of narcissism that describes “the phenomenon of love as an impoverishment of one’s self-love because all libido is turned to an object outside oneself (Fromm, p.84)”. He instead states that love for others and love of ourselves are not alternatives. They must both exist simultaneously.

While freud separates the notion of love into divisible categories, Fromm’s love is indivisible (but important to note that it starts with the self). Concerning environmental ethics, if we achieve a widened sense of self that spans all of our relata, then effort, or moral duty, is reduced as we transform the notion of self-sacrifice into self-interest. Self interest however, is not “conceived in terms of the subjective feeling of what one’s interest is, but in terms of what the nature of a human is objectively” (Fromm, p.86). Our inherent potentialities are not related to our impulses of the moment. Nevertheless, the misinterpretation of the term inherent potentialities as an extension of an ego-trip is strife in today’s society. An ego-trip that prioritises one’s economic status and career – “Isolating goods and services, independent of needs, it encourages self-interest through the lens of individualism.” It’s not to say that we shouldn’t focus on ourselves. But in order to attain self-realisation in separation to the ego, we must become more attuned to realising the manifestations of our true nature, as opposed to being ruled by the generalist goals of success handed down to us by societal expectation. By paying attention to this we may realise that non-humans too have inherent potentialities. Considering this I am reminded of a quote by the Roman emperor and stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius;

“Don’t you see the plants, the birds, the ants and spiders and bees going about their individual tasks, putting the world in order, as best they can? And you’re not willing to do your job as a human being? Why aren’t you running to do what your nature demands?

(meditations, p…).

We could consider a tree and its growth, its ability to sequester carbon and to provide a habitat for other living things. Does it do these things for some external validation or praise? We might say its inherent potentialities have been realised, in the way that its growth is tied to the other. Acquainting ourselves with the nature of our collective self-realisation as a species might seem unclear, but if we consider that our capacity for innovation has taken our survival out of the palm of competition’s hand, we might do better to realise the duty that is bound to our inherence.

“We are the first kind of living beings we know of who have the potential to live in community with all other living beings.”

(p.96).

According to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, a moral act is one of duty and against our inclination, but we may be compelled to carry it out due to the strength of our value systems. This can be an unsustainable, inconsistent and uncomfortable basis to act from. In contrast, a beautiful act is something we do based both on morals and positive inclination. A wider sense of self and identity means no moralising is needed to be selfless. We return to this idea of environmental ontology and realism as a superior, longer-range target, in opposition to environmental ethics as a means of invigorating action.

Bibliography

Overview

Using his own personal home of Tvargastein (a mountain cabin near the Norwegian city, Ustaoset) as an example, Naess demonstrates how sustained engagement with a place can make one more mindful of their consumption habits and raise ecological awareness. Though his methods border the extreme and his choice of home unique, he was able to determine how to attain the base necessities for life while living off-grid. “Water carried by hand from sources two hundred to three hundred metres away becomes more valuable” (2016, p….) he tells of his experience there. Resources are looked upon as having more value than before when one lives in such a way, “hence one experiences an increasing feeling of quality and richness.” He claims that a place can determine one’s attitudes, one’s likes and dislikes, and one’s general outlook. By engaging in scientific and observational activities in Tvargastein he was able to solidify a larger process of identification with his home. A place-person, as he would put it. He argues that this process is not only cognitive, but conative, being the element in psychological processes that tends towards activity or change and appears as desire, volition or striving.

In contrast, the urbanised, consumer driven world, puts us at the mercy of politics that systematically favours people “who concentrate mainly on getting more of what there is not enough of” (Naess, 2016, p…). The marketability of profound psychological transformation does not bode well with the intentions of mass corporations. Comfort has made us blind to our own potentialities. Instead of being taught to live in relation with our surroundings, many of us have been born into an unconsciously inherited ideology of place corrosiveness; That a place is there to serve us and our needs.

“The dependence on goods and technologies where one does not belong, the increase of structural complication of life – all these factors weaken or disrupt the steady belongingness to a place.”

Naess, 2016, p…

On the other hand, a sense of place is “strengthened through a tightening of the relationships between the self and the environment.” If this is the case then the question lies therein; How can we establish places as ‘places’ in industrialised cities, decrease detachment from these places and increase respective belongingness to a wider gestalt? Allowing inhabitants “to develop the appreciation of what there is enough of”.

Reflection

Naess’ idealistic views are admirable, but his experience of a place is untranslatable to most others that lack the land space, opportunity, freedom of thought and geographical positioning he had. He does not adequately define, in my opinion, a universally applicable way of becoming a place-person. If we were all to follow in his footsteps, what would come of our current homes? Would we just abandon them? Without the same level of exposure to free nature, how are we to cultivate the same mindset? While I believe Naess’ fundamental principle of a place, or place/person, is something to strive for, a middle ground is needed to allow people to familiarise themselves with such concepts whilst retaining their urbanised lives. Systemic change is needed in the economic and political drivers of our cities that perpetuate individualism. And basic needs have to be met globally to free people from certain daily constraints, if they are even to consider such concepts.

Bibliography

Overall this chapter was very hard to make sense of. It made me question again the usefulness of such rigorous philosophical exercises. Even Naess himself says in parts of the book that those of us who are engaged with our personal ‘place’ have no time for metaphysical thought, in favour of concrete action; “People who are completely absorbed in the land have no need for high levels of abstraction and articulation”. Although a digression from the intended reflection of this blog post, it is important to know that this quote is preceded by the sentence, “Most supporters of the deep ecology movement are intimately acquainted with urbanisation” which in turn gives them better training to make their implicit global attitudes a basis for action (Naess, 2016, p.45). From this, some light might be gleamed on the advantages of both concrete action and abstract thought.

The beginning of this chapter recognises the persistent criticism that environmental activists face when trying to save a natural entity – such as a river, forest, animal or some other form of living/ non-living thing – due to the subjectivity of their personal experience with said entity. Their critics argue that this is not “reality as in fact”, but “reality as they feel it.”

According to Galileo, the motion of water molecules are an intrinsic property of water and so part of reality itself. Felt warmth however takes on a subjective existence. Naess argues, however, that the primary properties of a thing are conceptual or ens rationis, in that they only exist within the mind and so inherently are not parts of reality for the observer. Galileo’s thing-in-itself conception of water is challenged again by Naess’ idea that “no quality of a thing is such that it is separable from others.” Naess sees sensing and comprehension as the ‘primary qualities’ of a thing; Concrete contents have a “one to one correlation with constellations,” defined here as a group of associated things. As a result our experience of water is in relation to an irreducible and complex constellation of relata, that eliminates both objectivism and subjectivism. Such is “the colours of the sea as a part of innumerable gestalts” (Naess, 2016, p.73).

Problematically, Galileo’s worldview that secondary contents are a result of our own projections removes the need for altruistic intentions altogether. If we were to reduce our conception of things to their supposed primary qualities, and pay no attention to our spontaneous experience of them using our senses, then everything is suddenly reduced to a resource. Naess rejects the notion that sense qualities are projected and that things in themselves exist separately from their myriad of secondary and tertiary qualities. Instead he proposes an ontology whereby all qualities are on par with one another, as a traditional take on primary properties presupposes them as merely characteristics of abstract structure, not contents of reality.

Using Naess’ ideas we can formulate a more sustainable method of creating environmental motivation. For the conservationist, concrete contents are most likely understood as a constellation of gestalt relations, whether they are conscious of it or not. For the developer, however, ethics surrounding environmental concerns are informed by feelings based on their objective view of reality. As a result, any attempt to appeal to their morality will fall on deaf ears. It seems it is more a matter of personal ontology. Therefore changing conception should be our primary concern as opposed to brute force. “There is no way of making the developer eager to save a forest as long as he or she retains the conception of it as a set of trees” (Naess, 2016, p.77).

“Ecology changes our values by changing our concepts of the world of ourselves in relation to the world.”

(Callicot, 1982)

Despite the reduction of primary properties to abstract structures, being those that exist within the mind, Naess reminds us it would be unwise to underestimate their importance. Such structures are applied throughout the world by humans to help gain a deeper understanding of it. They are paramount to science and that of deep ecology too. Nevertheless, these structures should not be over-identified as contents of the world we experience. As Naess puts it, “Abstract structures are structures of the world, not in the world” and “The world of concrete contents has gestalt character, not atomic character”(2016, pp.79-80). Thoughts on perspectivism, too, can help us reduce a subject-object division by using the term ‘experience’ without giving it ownership. After all, according to his holistic world view, our mere existence is only another piece of relata in the constellation of the world.

Bibliography

J. Baird Callicot, “Hume’s Is/Ought Dichotomy and the Relation of Ecology to Leopold’s Land Ethic.” Environmental ethics 4, 1982, pp.163-174

Naess’, Arne. “An Example of a Place: Tvargastein.” Ecology of Wisdom, edited by Alan Drengson and Bill Devall, Penguin Classics, 2016, p.45

Naess’, Arne. “The World of Concrete Contents.” Ecology of Wisdom, edited by Alan Drengson and Bill Devall, Penguin Classics, 2016, pp.71-80

The rather lengthy intro of Arne Naess’ Ecology Of Wisdom‘, while fairly repetitive, establishes a strong foundation of his fundamental beliefs. His unique home of Tvargastein and his passion for deep inquiry have culminated in a worldview in which he regards humans as, not superior, but equal to all other organic beings. His set of platform principles, namely deep ecology, is a framework for people to develop their own ecologically responsible philosophies. He coins these personal philosophies as Ecosophies: “All philosophies of life consist of basic value norms and basic hypotheses about the nature of the world. When these philosophies take careful account of ecological responsibilities, they become ecosophies” (Drengson, 2016, p.17).

Diversity in philosophy is celebrated within Deep Ecology. Quoting Naess, “There is no absolute truth and we must instead work together and respect each other’s methods and views to reach an integrated whole.” As I ponder on this I am reminded of certain indigenous practices I’d been exposed to whilst reading Karen Bakker’s book The Sounds of Life. An example that comes to mind is the Iñupiat (indigenous alaskan) fisherman who, in 1978, protested against the Whaling Commission’s ban on subsistence whaling in the Arctic. They argued that the number of whales left was far greater than the Commission’s calculations. Western reductionist science had already drawn its conclusions however, and the traditional, holistic knowledge of the Iñupiats were dismissed. While the techniques of data gathering scientists placed human perception at the centre of experience, the Iñupiats chose instead to listen closely to what their aquatic counterparts were communicating. Fascinatingly so, they had learnt to retrieve important information regarding whale activity by “placing the end of an oar up to their jaw, with the paddle in the water (Bakker, 2022, p.33).” An Iñupiat hydrophone? Methods such as these gave them an advantage over the Whaling Commission’s scientists and an Iñupiat-led bio-acoustic operation inevitably disproved the erroneous calculations. Their culture ultimately suffered unnecessarily as a result of industrial whaling and western ignorance. Returning to Naess’ quote, we see here how an integrated method using advanced western technology, indigenous knowledge and biocentrism became the most ideal solution.

Society has previously impacted the environment negatively by having a ‘consumption only’ relationship with the spaces it inhabits, driven by economic convention. By displacing indigenous peoples from these spaces, humanity discarded valuable, generational knowledge concerning a symbiotic relationship with our environment that made without the use of harmful technology. By simply listening to the whole (their extended selves?) and remaining a humble member of a wider gestalt, indigenous communities realised access to immense information that science is only now proving, many of which use obstructive techniques. Perhaps with the knowledge indigenous communities hold, we can refashion our utility of technology and science to restore said symbiosis.

On a more critical note, Naess’ suggested 4th principle of Deep Ecology states that we must “reduce our numbers” which I believe tows the line of ethical narrow mindedness. Without thorough context it fails to acknowledge the lack of education and healthcare in developing countries, that Naess may have had in his home of Norway. The prevalence of discrimination, marginalisation, lack of legal rights, fair education, inequality of opportunity and poverty globally strips people of the basic needs required for mental clarity. According to the UN, 71 percent of the world’s population live in countries where inequality has grown and “In 2018, the 26 richest people in the world held as much wealth as half of the global population” (n.d.). When such disparities exist it makes it somewhat unjustifiable to ethically condemn those with unsatisfactory living conditions. In this sense, privilege then becomes a pre-requisite for deep inquiry. Perhaps I would put greater importance on the relationship between social justice and environmental change if I were to rewrite the principles of Deep Ecology divulged in the book’s overture.

Added note from further reading: Given the wider context of the book, this ^ idea is implied and there is mention of this later however – “When basic needs are met human development is about being more, not having more.” (Earth Charter Initiative, 2000, cited in, Drengson, 2016, p.29)

Bibliography

Bakker, K. 2022. The Sounds Of Life. 1st ed. New Jersey, Princeton University Press, p.33

Drengson, A. 2016. Introduction. In: Naess, A. Ecology Of Wisdom. Drengson, A and Devall, B. Great Britain: Penguin Classics, p.17

Earth Charter Initiative, 2000. www.earthcharterinaction.org/2000/10/the_earth_charter.html, quoted in: Drengson, A. 2016. Introduction. In: Naess, A. Ecology Of Wisdom. Drengson, A and Devall, B. Great Britain: Penguin Classics, p.29

Nations, U. (n.d.). Inequality – Bridging the Divide. [online] United Nations. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/un75/inequality-bridging-divide#:~:text=From%201990%20to%202015%2C%20the [Accessed 12 Feb. 2024].